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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §§78-2a2(j)(2001 )(pour-over jurisdiction).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The following issue is presented on appeal:
1.

Could Fire Insurance Exchange refuse to make Birch whole out of its third-party tort
recovery? Summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 2003 UT 4; 2003 Utah LEXIS 11.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from summary judgment in favor of Birch's homeowners insurer, Fire

Insurance Exchange ("Fire Insurance"), in an action Birch brought to be made whole before Fire
Insurance could keep a third-party tort recovery.
2.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
Birch was a named insured in a homeowners insurance policy issued by Fire Insurance

Exchange. Birch brought suit for damages, individually, and on behalf of all insureds similarly
situated. Birch filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, and in response, Fire Insurance
Exchange filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted Fire Insurance Exchange's
motion, and denied Birch's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Birch appeals.
3.

Statement of Relevant Facts on Appeal
1

Birch was insured by Fire Insurance under a homeowners insurance policy. (R. 40-42; R. 82
and R. 122-3)1. Some neighborhood children were playing with matches and started a fire to the
southwest of Birch's property. (R. 40-41). The fire spread and damaged Birch's fence and
landscaping. (R. 41). The fire was extinguished by a passing plane that dumped fire retardant on the
area. (Id.) The fire retardant contained a red dye that stained the fence, shed, house and ground in
the immediate vicinity. (Id.)
Birch made a claim against his homeowners' policy with Fire Insurance to recover this loss.
(Id.) Fire Insurance paid for the replacement cost of the fence, which was the amount that Birch had
paid insurance for. (Id.) Birch and Fire Insurance agreed that the total amount of his insured loss was
$7,732.91. (R. 82). Fire Insurance paid this, minus a $500.00 deductible. (R. 41). It then sought
recovery from the insurer for the neighborhood children. (Id.) Fire Insurance's claim for third-party
recovery was settled out of court for approximately 95% of the loss2. (Id.) Fire Insurance then
tendered Birch a check, not for his $500.00 deductible, but for $475.00. (Id.) Fire Insurance
explained that $475.00 was 95% of $500.00, and that Birch would only receive reimbursement of
his loss on a "pro rata" basis with Fire Insurance. (Id.; R. 45).
Birch sent a letter back, inquiring why he wasn't made whole prior to Fire Insurance keeping
some of the tort recovery. (R. 46). Fire Insurance responded, asserting that "[t]he insured share is
proportional to the recovery". (R. 47). Birch disagreed, but Fire Insurance insisted that "Utah is a
!

The basic facts are set forth in both parties' memoranda, and the court's opinion. While
there are slight differences, there is no material dispute as to the facts.
2

In briefing this appeal, Birch notes that Fire Insurance claimed it settled for 95%, but
never actually produced a copy of the settlement draft or any other documentation from the thirdparty settlement. Fire Insurance asks Birch and the Court take it on faith that the 5% reduction
was for "depreciation".
2

pro-rata state", and refused to pay the full amount of the deductible. (R. 49). Birch sued for the full
amount of his deductible.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Birch, the insured, must be "made whole" before Fire Insurance, the insurer, can keep a thirdparty recovery. This means Birch should be reimbursed for his entire deductible, not just a portion
of it. Further, the full measure of damages for damage to realty is replacement cost. The trial court
arbitrarily accepted the insurer's use of 5% "depreciation" to "nick" Birch for 5% of his deductible.
ARGUMENT
A.
BIRCH MUST BE "MADE WHOLE" BEFORE FIRE INSURANCE
CAN KEEP ANY TORT RECOVERY PROCEEDS
Utah recognizes "subrogation", the right of an insurer, after paying a covered loss, to take
the place of the insured and recover its losses from an at-fault tort-feasor.
The doctrine of subrogation allows an insurer, "having paid a loss resulting from a
peril insured against, to step into the shoes of its insured and recoup its losses from
a tort-feasor whose negligence caused the loss." Board of Educ. v. Hales, 566 P.2d
1246, 1247 (Utah 1977); accord, Fashion Place Inv. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County, 776
P.2d 941, 944 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989).
GNSPartnership v. Fuller, 873 P.2d 1157,1158 (Utah App. 1994). When the insurer or the insured
obtains a recovery, the insured is entitled to be "made whole", or fully compensated, first, before the
insurer keeps any portion of the recovery:
[sjubrogation is an equitable doctrine governed by equitable principles. This doctrine
can be modified by contract, but in the absence of express terms to the contrary, the
insured must be made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed
from a recovery from a third-party tortfeasor. Non-contractual subrogation rights
will only be enforced on behalf of a party maintaining a superior equitable position,
and the insurer's equitable position cannot be superior to the insured's unless the
insured has been completely compensated.
3

Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988)(internal citations omitted,
emphasis added).
Hill makes clear that an insured must first be completely compensated before the insurer can
recover even one penny from an at-fault party. Therefore, Birch was entitled to be reimbursed his
entire $500.00 deductible before Fire Insurance can keep a single penny. Fire Insurance admitted in
its answer that it kept $25.00 from Birch's $500.00 deductible. Birch was entitled to partial judgment
on the pleadings in the amount of $25.00.
This formula was clearly applied in Gibbs M. Smith v. U.S.F.&G, 949 P.2d 337 (1997). In
Gibbs M. Smith, the insured recovered some payment directly from the tortfeasor, and the insurer
claimed that amount. The Utah Supreme Court directly ruled that the insurer could keep the money
"after full compensation of the insured":
The proper doctrine applicable in this case is the insurer's right of subrogation
against the wrongdoer. Not only may an insurer seek reimbursement from the
wrongdoer for payments previously made to an insured, but "the payment by a
tortfeasor for property damage to an insured ordinarily relieves the insurance
company from paying therefore." 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §1813 (1982). See
generally id. at § § 1815-1818. Where the insured has received payment from both the
insurer and the wrongdoer, "[t]he general rule is unquestionably that the insurer can
recover from the insured, of the sum of insurance paid upon the policy... the excess
received from the wrongdoer after full compensation for insured's loss, including
costs and expenses thereof." Shawnee Fire Ins. Co. v. Cosgrove, 86 Kan. 374, 121
P. 488, 489 (1912); see also Annotation, Insurance - Loss Paid by Another 51
A.L.R.2d, at 697, §6, at 712, Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 114
Utah 355, 199 P.2d 567 (1948); Ortiz v. Great Southern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 597
S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1980)(insurer can recover excess collected from wrongdoer after
insured is fully compensated). Therefore, although U.S.F.&G. is liable to Gibbs for
the sum of damages it must pay to Heinz plus associated costs and expenses, any
payment received in excess of that amount is the rightful property of U.S.F.&G.
Gibbs M. Smith, at 345 (emphasis added). By arbitrarily deducting $25.00 from Birch's pocket, Fire
Insurance prevented him from being made whole, or receiving full compensation.
4

The only way this can be changed is by statute, Anderson v. UPS, 2004 UT 57,

P.3d

,

(workers compensation insurer entitled to first-dollar reimbursement under statutory distribution
scheme), or contract, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48, ^34; 486 Utah Adv Rep
3; 2003 Utah LEXIS 114, ("the doctrine of equitable subrogation generally can be modified by
contract"). Fire Insurance offered no statute, and no policy language, that the general rule of
equitable subrogation had been modified in this case.
The Hill decision has been adopted as the public policy of Utah by the Insurance
Commission. After the Hill decision, insurers in Utah began to submit new insurance policy forms
to the Utah State Insurance Commission for approval, containing language explicitly allowing the
insurer to recover before the insurer was fully compensated. The Insurance Commissioner rejected
the forms with the "insurer-first" subrogation language, and then issued a bulletin dated October 23,
1996, stating the public policy of the State of Utah with respect to subrogation rights. Bulletin 96-7
"Frequent problems found in Filings". (R.53). The bulletin states that "[a]n insured must first be
made whole before the insurance company subrogates... .An insured must receive his due before
payment of amounts to which the insurer makes claim will be allowed." (Emphasis added). Birch
has not received his due, in direct violation of the Utah Insurance Commissioner's decision NOT to
allow insurers to keep third-party recovery, at the expense of its insured.
B
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY LIMITED BIRCH TO AN
ARBITRARILY ASSUMED AMOUNT OF TORT DAMAGES
The trial court's ruling was that Birch was only entitled to keep an amount equal to the
recovery of damages in tort. The trial court simply assumed that it was undisputed that 95% of the
cost of replacement or restoration equaled the fiill recovery of tort damages for destruction of
5

fixtures and damage to realty, by application of a 5% discount for "depreciation". However, the tort
measure of damages to realty is ordinarily the cost of repair or restoration. Marks v. Culmer, 6 Utah
419,24 P. 528, 531 (1890)("the property [a building] being of such a nature that it could be readily
reproduced [i]ts value to the plaintiffs would be what it would cost to reproduce it, and the value of
its use while that was being done").3
Even if one accepts this predicate, that the tort recovery should include 5% "depreciation",
the application was wrong. 95% of $7,732.91 (replacement or restoration cost) is $7,346.26. Since
the trial court purported to limit Birch to the limits of the tort recovery, only, Birch should have been
theoretically limited to $ 113.35 (being $7,732.91 - $7,346.26), not $475.00. This highlights how the
trial court's ruling diverges from Fire Insurance's approach, rather than supports it. Recall that Fire
Insurance simply pro-rated the entire recovery, using an arbitrary 5% discount for "depreciation".
But there are many reasons why the amount of tort recovery or settlement might diverge from
full compensation for the insured. For instance, application of comparative fault might result in a
homeowner recovery only $30,000.00 for damages to a landscape feature valued and insured for
$50,000.00. An owner of a Hummer might only recover $25,000.00 (representing the minimum
property damage requirement for auto insurance) from an otherwise insolvent driver, though the
vehicle be valued and insured for much more. The normal vagaries of litigation (missing or uncertain
witnesses, a desire not to miss work for court, etc.) might also lead an insured to settle for less than
a full recovery. Or, there might be a statutory cap on damages (e.g., against governmental

3

Unlike automobiles, real estate (including landscaping and fences) do not necessarily
depreciate once purchased. The usual belief is that landscaping and fences add value, and do not
depreciate. Fire Insurance offered no evidence to support its claim for application of depreciation
in this case.
6

defendants) of $250,000.00, while the insured loss was $500,000.00. Is the insured really just limited
to the amount of the tort recovery, with the insurer keeping the rest? Or is it the insurer who bears
the risk of an incomplete tort recovery?
The short, simple rule is that the insured gets first-dollar from any third-party recovery, in
the absence of statute or contract, until the insured has been frilly compensated for his loss. Because
the insured has contract and paid for complete indemnification, any risk of loss or shortfall is borne
by the insurer.
CONCLUSION
Fire Insurance cannot stand first in line in dividing up a third-party tort recovery. Fire
Insurance and Birch do not stand together, to share pro rata, either. Birch stands first in line, and
must be paid $500.00, his entire deductible, before Fire Insurance may keep any recovery. The
assumption by Fire Insurance that it was entitled to a 5% discount for "depreciation" was not
supported by any law or facts. The measure of damage for injury to realty is the reasonable cost of
restoration. Fire Insurance was not entitled to create a new rule, nor was the trial court. This matter
should be reversed and remanded for entry of partial summary judgment in Birch's favor.
DATED THIS 25th day of October, 2004.

A

Daniel F. Bertch
Kevin K. Robson
Attorneys for Appellant
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

RANDY B. BIRCH, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated
MINUTE ENTRY
Plaintiffs,
CASE NO. 030903993
vs.
JUDGE L.A. DEVER
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant.

This matter came before the above entitled Court for oral arguments on March 1,
2004. While originally presented as a Motion For Judgment on The Pleadings, the
parties were able to stipulate1 to certain facts thereby converting the matter to a cross
Motion For Summary Judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court took the
matter under advisement. Now, having fully considered the parties' arguments along
with the relevant legal authorities the Court rules as stated herein.
The relevant facts are as follows. On August 12, 2002, children playing with
matches set fire to plaintiff Randy Birch's property. The fire was put out by a passing
plane which dumped fire retardant that ultimately damaged Birch's fence and

Specifically, the parties stipulated: 1) the reason for the 5% deduction on Birch's
reimbursement was depreciation; and 2) Farmers decision to settle for 95% of the total
loss was reasonable.

Birch v Farmers Insurance

Page 2

Minute Entry

landscaping. As a result, Mr. Birch made a claim against his homeowners policy with
Farmers Insurance Group to recover his loss.

Farmers paid for the replacement of the

fence, minus Birch's $500.00 deductible and sought recovery from the at-fault party.
Farmers settled out of court with the at fault party insurer for 95% of the total loss
suffered by Birch.
On November 18, 2002, Farmers tendered a check for $475.00 to Birch
amounting to 95% of his deductible. When Mr. Birch questioned why he was not
"made whole" and reimbursed his entire $500.00 deductible, Farmers explained that
because the at fault insurer had taken some amount for the depreciation of the fence,
Farmers was unable to collect 100%. See, December 19, 2002 letter

Disagreeing with

Farmers, Birch filed this class action lawsuit claiming that as the insured he is entitled to
full compensation and therefore this Court should make him whole by awarding him the
remaining $25.00.
In Utah, an insured "must be made whole before the insurer is entitled to be
reimbursed from a recovery from the third-party tort-feasor." Hill v State Farm Mutual
765 P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988)(citing. Lyon v Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 480 P.2d
739, 744 (1971)). The parties do not dispute this statement of the law. What is in
dispute, however, is what it means for Mr. Birch "to be made whole." Farmers
contends that in order to be made whole, in the context of this case, Mr. Birch is entitled
to his entire tort damages which are the actual replacement cost of the fence minus any
depreciation. Birch, on the other hand, argues that in order to be made whole he is

Birch v Farmers Insurance

Page 3

Minute Entry

entitled to the full amount, or 100% of his deductible.
In Hill the Utah Court determined "[wjhere the insured settles with the tort-feasor,
the settlement amount goes to the insured unless the insurer can prove that the insured
has already received full compensation." ]d. at 868. Here, the Court concludes that
Farmers has proved Mr. Birch received full compensation for his tort damages in the
amount of $475.00 representing 95% of his deductible.2

Mr. Birch was paid that

amount and therefore has been made whole as to his tort damages under the
reasoning provided by the Court in HHJ. For this reason, the Court grants defendant
Farmers' Motion For Summary Judgment.
Defendant's counsel to draft an Order consistent with this Minute Entry for
submission to the Court.

Dated this

*

day of May, 2004.

BY THE COURT:

2

ln this case, the whole amount of damages was $7,732.91 for the liquidated
replacement value of the fence. Farmers, as Mr. Birch's insurer, collected from the
third party insurer $7,732.91 minus 5% for depreciation. Consequently, Mr. Birch was
paid $475.00, or 95% of his deductible, to allow for the 5% deduction for depreciation.

